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Chapter 8
The Development of the
U.S. Army Pension Plan
Although both the army and the navy pension plans were initially estab-
lished by the Continental Congress during the Revolution, neither plan was
Wnancially viable in any long-run sense until Alexander Hamilton’s reforms
in the 1790s. Even after these reforms, there remained an important differ-
ence in the manner in which the two pension systems were Wnanced. The
army pensions were organized on a pay-as-you-go basis from the general
revenues of the Continental Congress and later the U.S. Treasury. In con-
trast, both the original and reformed navy pension plans were funded by
the monies resulting from the liquidation of prizes and contraband. This
difference in pension funding between the services was apparent in the
broader compensation of personnel in the two services both before and
after the Revolution. Until the twentieth century, navy personnel were com-
pensated with a salary and “rations” (nominally payments in kind), as
well as the possibility of shares of funds derived from the liquidation the
prizes captured by their ship. In contrast, army personnel were primarily
compensated by wages. This difference and the economic history that ex-
plains it, provides an interesting background for the development of pub-
lic and private pensions in the United States and is consistent with modern
economic theories of human resource management. This chapter reviews
the history of U.S. army pensions and the ultimate merger of the army and
navy plans at the end of the nineteenth century.
Revolutionary War Pensions
The act of August 1776, in which the Continental Congress reorganized the
Revolutionary navy pensions,1 also created a pension plan for the person-
nel of the Continental army. The initial objective of the Revolutionary army
pension plan was the same as that of the navy plan explained above. The
aim was to provide a disability plan for soldiers injured as a result of their
military service. According to the act, the actual amount of the disability
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annuity varied with the degree of disability but was not to exceed half-
pay for life or during the period of disability. Ultimately, these disability
pensions were revised to meet a second objective, which was to provide
retirement pensions for ofWcers of the Continental army. These retirement
pensions were intended to provide an incentive for the ofWcers to remain
on duty until the end of the Revolution. In contrast, the Continental Con-
gress provided no retirement pensions for naval personnel and only one
state, Pennsylvania, offered such pensions to its own naval ofWcers.
The Pennsylvania assembly adopted a plan for its naval ofWcers much like
that offered ultimately by the Continental Congress to ofWcers of the Con-
tinental Army. All ofWcers of the Pennsylvania navy who were commissioned
in March 1779 and still on duty in March 1780 were promised half-pay for
life should they remain in the service until the cessation of hostilities.
Pennsylvania also maintained a disability plan, and it was explicitly funded
with one-third of the prize monies earned by its naval forces. Curiously, this
funding scheme appears to have worked much like the current Social
Security system and the post-Civil War U.S. navy pension fund. While the
prize monies were nominally credited to the fund, in practice they simply
went into the state’s general fund and liabilities were paid from general
funds without any reference to the prize fund.
It is generally thought that a retirement plan was not provided for naval
ofWcers because their share of prizes they captured provided them with
remuneration of a form and extent not readily available to army ofWcers. Of
course, as noted in Chapter 3, throughout history army ofWcers enjoyed the
fruits of “prizes” captured by their troops. However, in most cases, these
were not ofWcially sanctioned by national governments in the same manner
as prizes taken at sea. Hence, to formally supplement the lifetime earnings
of army ofWcers and perhaps at the time more importantly to keep them in
the Weld until independence from the British had been secured, the
Continental Congress sought to complement wages and the disability plan
with a retirement plan. While Congress eventually achieved this objective
for army personnel, it was only after some serious renegotiating of the
plan’s original characteristics that a satisfactory compromise was obtained.
Ultimately, these pension promises were honored only after the federal
government was restructured by the Constitution. However, before that set-
tlement, army pensions became a major political issue, particularly during
the late stages of the Revolution.
The role of pensions as a form of deferred compensation became all too
evident to the civilian leaders of the Revolution when in 1780 a clique of
inXuential ofWcers began demanding some form of pension for the post-
Revolution period. This issue became known as the “Newburgh Conspir-
acy” after the town in New York where army leaders gathered to further
press their demands in 1783. These demands initially resulted from three
factors.2 First, by almost any reasonable standard, the material condition of
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the Continental army had been abysmal. Low wages, infrequent payments,
and in some cases long arrearages had plagued army administration since
the early days of the Revolution. As a result, dedicated ofWcers of any means
had Wnanced the activities of their commands from their personal estates.
Viewed in this light, the ofWcers were simply requesting payment for ser-
vices rendered. Recognizing that the cash-Xow crisis faced by Congress
rendered immediate redress impossible, they were willing to accept their
remuneration in the form of future payments. 
Second, the most disgruntled ofWcers were Weld commanders who rec-
ognized that, whatever speciWc form the future republic took, there was
probably little hope of any role for a large, well-compensated professional
military caste. Thus, their expectation was that they would be provided
with a postwar income as a token of the republic’s gratitude. Compounding
both of these grievances was the fact that administrative ofWcers had con-
tinued to receive regular pay while Weld ofWcers and their men had not. In
addition, the ofWcers had a perception that their pre-war colleagues who
had not served in the army had prospered Wnancially during the war or
would do so afterward. Finally, nationalists in the Congress were eager to
exploit the situation by recruiting the ofWcers to the nationalist cause while
simultaneously wielding them as a threat against anti-nationalist opponents.
The move toward nationalism was a natural one, since a strong national
government could logically be expected to be more likely to have the
Wnancial clout to honor the ofWcers’ pecuniary claim. An unmolliWed ofW-
cer corps was the greatest threat to the hard-won liberty from the British.
On both fronts, the nationalists were successful.
In order to keep the troops in the Weld during the crucial months lead-
ing up to the Battle of Yorktown (1781), Congress authorized the payment
of a life annuity, equal to one-half base pay, to all ofWcers remaining in the
service for the duration of the Revolution. It was not long before Congress
realized that both its current cash-Xow situation and the present value of its
future tax revenues were insufWcient to meet this promise. While the public
Wnances limped along between the victory at Yorktown and the Treaty of
Paris, the rebellious ofWcers, led by Generals McDougall and Gates, could
not be put off indeWnitely. In the spring of 1783, Congress converted the life
annuities to a Wxed-term payment equal to full pay for Wve years. Even these
more limited obligations were not fully paid to qualifying veterans and only
the direct intervention of George Washington prevented a coup (Ferguson
1961; Middlekauf 1982). Shortly after, the Treaty of Paris was signed in
September of 1783, the Continental Army was furloughed. It took another
eight years before the Constitution and Alexander Hamilton’s Wnancial
reforms placed the new federal government in a position to honor its pen-
sion obligations.
Complicating the history of these early federal military pensions is the
fact that they were inextricably tied to those promised by individual
124 Chapter 8
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colonies and later states. Between the end of the Revolution and the Wrst
Washington administration, there was a great deal of disagreement between
the states and the federal government concerning the settlement of liabili-
ties and debts accumulated during the war. In addition to the problems
caused by the state navies and militia,3 the settlement of state accounts was
complicated by the fact that in 1780–81 the Continental Congress aban-
doned the system of using colonial militias to supply the army with troops;
rather, enlistments were formalized in the Continental army for three years
or the duration of the war. 
At the time of the aforementioned conversion of ofWcers’ pensions from
life annuities to Wxed-term payments, ofWcers who had served in the state
ranks were given the option of receiving (or at least applying for) their pen-
sions from their state as opposed to the federal government. However, the
Wnancial condition of most states and other administrative problems con-
cerning such applications caused the vast majority of ofWcers to Wle for
the federal pension. Eventually, enlisted personnel also were promised pen-
sions and the federal government settled most of these claims. Most of these
pension claims were commuted in exchange for federal or state debt, and
this debt was ultimately consolidated in the new federal debt issues of the
1790s. It should be noted that much of the original debt, including that
held by the ofWcers of the Revolution, was liquidated in secondary markets,
sometimes at a steep discount. More than a few former ofWcers were embit-
tered by the republic’s handling of their pensions. Although most ofWcers
of the state militias sought their pensions from the national government,
some states, including North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia hon-
ored pensions for at least some of those who served in their militias during
the Revolution.
U.S. Army Pensions Before the Civil War
Unlike the navy pension plan, the army pension system was funded by
annual appropriations from general revenues. Thus, decisions to expand
coverage or change beneWts were not related to the status of a pension fund
itself, but instead were made in response to changes in political and eco-
nomic conditions that inXuenced Congress. Both disability and retirement
pensions for U.S. army personnel dated from the Revolution and the early
republic. However, these pensions were solely for the veterans of the Revo-
lution. Thus at the time the Constitution was ratiWed, there was no U.S.
army pension plan. Subsequently, during the early years of the republic,
several army pension plans were established, discarded, and revised. In
fact, there was both a “regular” army plan and a speciWc plan for veterans
of each of the country’s wars, declared or otherwise. There were many,
often minor, revisions to each of these plans. A comprehensive review of
all of the revisions to the army pension plan is beyond the scope of this
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volume; however, the remainder of this chapter contains a summary of the
primary provisions of each of the original versions of these army pension
plans and any key revisions.4
Originally, the Continental Congress gave eligible ofWcers of the Revo-
lution the choice of accepting half-pay for life, a cash settlement worth Wve
years’ full pay, or 6-percent notes worth Wve years’ pay. In fact, Congress
never had the funds to pay either the principal or the interest on these
claims fully. Robert Morris, serving as de facto Wnance minister of the new
republic, attempted to organize the army accounts as he had the navy
accounts. In response, the national government issued interest-bearing
“commutation certiWcates” in lieu of either cash or notes. Ultimately, $11
million worth of such certiWcates were issued to ofWcers and men of the
Continental army and the militias of the various states. This Wgure repre-
sented roughly 40 percent of the entire debt of the country under the
Articles of Confederation. It should be remembered that the states them-
selves were attempting to honor another $3 to $5 million in pension debt
to their soldiers (Ferguson 1961, 180). Estimates of the average amounts
received suggest the following beneWt scale: $10,000 for generals; $1,500
to $4,400 for other ofWcers depending on rank, and $200 to $300 for com-
mon soldiers. It ultimately took the Wnancial reforms of Alexander Ham-
ilton to Wnally put the funding of the Revolutionary War pensions on a
sound footing at least by the standards of the day. 
In 1790, Congress, which now convened under the auspices of the Con-
stitution, reorganized pension Wnances, issuing new interest-bearing certi-
Wcates to replace the old claims. While this act resolved the long-standing
conXict between former ofWcers and the federal government, it did nothing
for veterans, mostly enlisted personnel who had sold their certiWcates at a
discount years before. In 1818, however, Congress partially addressed this
situation by granting a pension to any veteran of the Revolution who had
served at least nine months and who could prove indigence. Revolutionary
War pensions were further broadened in 1828 when any soldier, regardless
of rank, who had served to the end of the Revolution was granted full pay
for life retroactive to 1826. The law was amended in 1832 to include all vet-
erans of the Revolution regardless of when they served. Hence 49 years
after the signing of the treaty that ended the war, every surviving veteran of
the Revolutionary War received a pension equal to 100 percent of his base
pay at the end of the war. 
The Wrst pension plan for “regular” military personnel was passed in
April 1790 after the ratiWcation of the U.S. Constitution. It speciWed that
disabled commissioned ofWcers were to receive a beneWt of not more than
one-half their base pay and enlisted personnel were to receive not more
than Wve dollars a month. Only the veterans of the Revolution were to
receive a pension that was paid in the form of deferred compensation—
126 Chapter 8
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that is, a retirement plan, using today’s term. The initial regular army plan
remained in place with only minor revisions until 1885. Initially, like the
original Revolutionary War plan and the subsequent navy plan, the regular
army plan was a disability plan. Until the Civil War there was no formal
retirement plan for army personnel; however, soldiers who were discharged
after 1800 were given three months’ pay as severance. OfWcers were initially
offered the same severance package as enlisted personnel, but in 1802,
ofWcers began receiving one month’s pay for each year of service over three
years. Hence an ofWcer with 12 years of service earning, say, $40 a month
could, theoretically, convert his severance into an annuity, which at 6 per-
cent would pay $2.40 a month or less than $30 a year. This was substantially
less than a prime farmhand could expect to earn and a pittance compared
to that of, say, a British ofWcer.
Prior to the onset of the War of 1812, Congress supplemented these
disability and severance packages with a type of retirement pension. Any
soldier who enlisted for Wve years and who was honorably discharged would
receive, in addition to his three months’ severance, 160 acres of land from
the so-called military reserve. If he was killed in action or died in the ser-
vice, his heir(s) would receive the same beneWt. The reservation price of
public land at that time was $2.00 per acre ($1.64 for cash). So, the sever-
ance package would have been worth roughly $350, which, annuitized at 6
percent, would have yielded less than $2.00 a month in perpetuity. This was
an ungenerous settlement by almost any standard. Of course in a nation of
small farmers, 160 acres might have represented a good start for a young
cash-poor farmhand just out of the army. With the onset of the war, new
recruits were granted the same beneWts as regular army veterans. In 1816,
the widows’ and orphans’ beneWt, in the form of a cash annuity of the type
that had been granted to survivors of navy personnel in 1813, was provided
for survivors of soldiers who were killed or died in the service.
The disability, severance, and survivors’ beneWts from the War of 1812
were paid for the next 60 years. As noted above, in 1832 the Revolutionary
War pensions for army veterans were converted to life annuities with no dis-
ability or extenuating circumstances required. Indigency had been the most
prevalent of the extenuating circumstances required to receive a pension
before 1832. Similarly, poverty could still secure a pension for veterans of
the War of 1812 until 1871, when all surviving veterans of the war who had
served six months or more were granted life annuities regardless of need.
Those serving two or more years received their full base pay up to that of a
captain while those serving from six months to two years had their pay
reduced proportionally until a veteran of at least six months received 25
percent of base pay for life. Table 8.1 contains the history of the pension
payments to veterans of the War of 1812 and their widows after the conver-
sion of the disability pension to an old-age pension in 1871. 
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After the War of 1812, the army dwindled in size. There were only 8,500
ofWcers and men on active duty in 1845. Subsequent disputes with Mexico
eventually brought that state of affairs to an end. Shortly after Congress
authorized the president to recruit volunteers for the Mexican War, the
regular army pension and severance beneWts were extended to volunteers
just as had been done for new recruits during the War of 1812. Although
the land grants continued, by the end of the war such warrants as could
be converted into deeds were frequently sold in the market at steep dis-
counts, often in the neighborhood of $0.75 an acre (Lebergott 1987). At
these prices, the land component of a soldier’s severance package would
have been annuitized at less than $1 a month. In 1848, a new widows’ and
orphans’ beneWt, half-pay for Wve years, was bestowed on survivors of Mexi-
can War veterans. The period of the beneWt payment was subsequently
extended. In 1858, the survivors beneWt was paid to widows for life or until
they remarried, and orphans were covered until they reached age 16. As
with the Revolution and the War of 1812, surviving veterans of the Mexican
War eventually received a retirement pension. In 1887, all honorably dis-
charged veterans who had served 60 days or more and who had attained the
age of 62 were eligible for a life annuity of $8.00 a month. This annuity was
also available to all disabled or indigent veterans (regardless of age) and
widows who had not remarried. Table 8.2 contains the history of the pen-
sion payments to veterans of the Mexican War and their widows after the
conversion of the disability pension to an old-age pension in 1887.
Relatively speaking, the U.S. army was quite small during years of peace
in the nineteenth century, usually in the neighborhood of 10,000 ofWcers
and men. Because the army was not seen as a career by the majority of those
who served, tens of thousands of men served in the army without partici-
pating in one of the three antebellum conXicts that ultimately led to an old-
age pension. Many of these veterans served during one of the Indian Wars
of the era. Recognizing both the inherent inequity in this situation and the
opportunity to obtain political support from veterans and their families,
Congress eventually formally granted these veterans an old-age pension as
well. The $8.00 monthly annuity granted to Mexican War veterans or their
widows in 1887 was extended to all veterans (and their widows who had not
remarried) who had served in the Indian Wars between 1832 and 1842.
This annuity, which was initially granted in 1892 was later extended to vet-
erans of other Indian campaigns as well. Table 8.3 contains the history of
the pension payments to veterans of the Indian Wars and their widows after
the creation of an old-age pension in 1892.
This history of early army pensions shows that every army disability
pension plan created before the Civil War ultimately was converted to a
retirement pension for veterans who survived long enough. Of course, long
enough could be a very long time, 50 or so years in many instances. A veteran
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who went to war as a young man would have to survive at least to his mid-
sixties or so to have received his retirement pension in most cases. Yet it
should be noted that this was roughly the age we have come to associate
with “normal” retirement. These pensions were not particularly lucrative by
the standards of retirement pensions in the twenty-Wrst century, but by the
standards of the day, they eventually came to represent a substantial Wnan-
cial windfall for aged veterans. The monthly annuity of $8.00 would have
been roughly one-third the monthly wage of an experienced farm laborer
in the second half of the nineteenth century. Despite the eventual conver-
sion of the antebellum army pensions to life annuities, there was no sys-
tematic “regular” army retirement plan prior to the Civil War. In fact, it was
exigencies associated with the war that led to the Wrst army retirement plan
The Civil War and the Development of
Modern Military Pensions
Of all the military pension plans in U.S. history, perhaps none has been
more written about than the Civil War pensions. The attention paid to the
Civil War pensions results both from the importance of the war itself as a
landmark in American history and because in one way or another millions
of Americans were directly impacted by the basic pension plan. Inter-
estingly, most scholarly attention has focused on the disability features of
the Civil War plans; for the purposes of this volume the introduction of
retirement pensions during the war is much more salient. Before turning to
retirement policies, an outline of the disability plan is warranted, since it
was from that plan that many of the old-age pension ultimately emerged
(see Oliver 1917; Costa 1998).
When Fort Sumter was attacked in April 1861, there were roughly 16,000
ofWcers and men in the U.S. army. Despite expectations that the troops
would be home by Christmas—the Christmas of 1861 not 1865—this Wgure
was about to grow dramatically. In July 1861, Congress authorized President
Abraham Lincoln to raise half a million volunteers and it enacted the Wrst
Civil War pension act. The act basically extended the same beneWts received
by regular army personnel to the new enlistees. In addition, should a sol-
dier die in uniform, his widow and legal heirs were promised $100 and
any pay that was in arrears. These payments were expanded along with
other services, such as medical, hospital, and housing beneWts. In 1890,
Congress granted a pension to all surviving veterans who suffered from any
disability. In the same year, the Pension Bureau instructed examining physi-
cians to grant a pension to all veterans over age 65 unless they were “unusu-
ally vigorous.” By 1900, the average beneWt per recipient was $135. This was
a substantial sum at the time (Costa 1998). Table 8.4 contains a summary
of the number of “general law” or disability pensioners after the Civil War.
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In addition to the disability pensions that eventually became old-age
beneWts, the Civil War ushered in a new era of retirement pensions for U.S.
army ofWcers and later enlisted men. At the onset of the war, Lincoln was
confronted with a number of superannuated ofWcers in all branches of
the service. In an effort to reduce the number of older ofWcers, in August
1861 Congress passed the Wrst legislation creating a formal “retired list” for
ofWcers in all branches of the military service. From that date, ofWcers were
retired if deemed incapable of serving in the Weld by a retirement board, or
upon application of the ofWcer after 40 years of service. This act limited the
size of the retirement list to 7 percent of the “active” list. This action kept
ofWcers in uniform during the war but subsequently proved troublesome
for War Department administrators. The limitations placed on the size of
the retired list survived in one form or another until World War I. There
were numerous revisions to these rules; many of which were quite minor
but a few were substantial. For example, when the 1861 act was amended in
1870, the major changes included: (1) placing a numerical limit of 300 on
the retirement list (raised to 400 in 1875); (2) authorizing retirement at 30
years at the president’s discretion; and (3) establishing retirement pay at 75
percent of base pay at the time of retirement. 
The restrictions on the size of the retirement list proved to be a perpet-
ual management problem for the War Department throughout the postbel-
lum era. Many ofWcers who should have been retired because of physical or
mental inWrmities, the latter often associated with drink, were maintained
on the active list simply because there was no legal provision for doing any-
thing else with them. This situation was ameliorated somewhat in 1882,
when Congress imposed the Wrst compulsory retirement law affecting army
personnel. Under this legislation, retirement became mandatory at age 64.
Unfortunately and somewhat obtusely, no change was made to the previ-
ously established limit on the number of ofWcers who could be carried on
the retired list. This untenable situation was rectiWed in the following year,
when Congress established a second retired list for ofWcers who were com-
pelled to retire due to age. There was no numerical limit placed on this
second list; however, one could not move from one list to another. Thus, an
ofWcer retired early due to unWtness for Weld duty could not be transferred
to the mandatory retirement list upon reaching age 64. As a result, the “lim-
ited” retired list remained fully subscribed at 400. Thus, it remained the
case that many ofWcers who would have otherwise been retired early were
kept on active duty until they reached the mandatory retirement age.
This situation was Wnally resolved de facto, if not de jure, in 1890.
Legislation of that year mandated that ofWcers failing to physically qualify
for promotion to the next rank were automatically relegated to a newly
created “unlimited” retired list. In the following year, ofWcers on the old
(limited) list were automatically transferred to the unlimited list upon
reaching age 64. However, in response to the inXuential ofWcers’ lobby,
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Congress reduced the size of the limited list to 350 ofWcers. Because of the
logjam of senior ofWcers, an ofWcer entering military service in his early
twenties would typically expect to rise no higher than lieutenant colonel
before reaching retirement age. 
The ofWcer corps staunchly supported the legislative limitations on the
number of ofWcers who could be retired for a lack of “Wtness.” There were
two “observationally equivalent” explanations for constraints. The Wrst and
more charitable of the two is that by limiting the number of ofWcers who
could be retired, Congress also limited the ability of the retirement boards
to become embroiled in patronage politics. In any given year, the actual
number of ofWcers to be retired was quite small, perhaps no more than ten
or twenty. With a relatively small number of retirements, “capturing” the
process in order to bend it toward the settling of old scores and making new
friends was hardly worth the time and effort it would take to do so. The sec-
ond explanation is that the limitations were simply a form of rents Congress
shared with senior military personnel. Through their many posts and con-
tracts the army and navy were capable of showering visiting Congressmen
with all the appropriate honors, and Congressmen with acquaintances in
businesses seeking military contracts were always eager to support their
men in uniform. Maintaining the good will of the ofWcers was good business
long before the term “military-industrial complex” was made a part of the
lexicon by President Eisenhower in his farewell address.
It is important to note that these retirement acts only applied to ofWcers.
With the exception of the pension acts dealing with veterans of the
Revolution and the War of 1812, the army offered no general retirement
plan to enlisted personnel before 1885. The 1885 act created the Wrst sys-
tematic retirement plan for enlisted personnel in the U.S. army. It permit-
ted retirement upon the completion of 30 years’ service at 75 percent of
base pay. The plan was subsequently amended in 1890 and soldiers were
permitted to count wartime service as double time in the calculation of
years of service.
Recall from the previous chapters that the navy created retirement plans
for its ofWcers and seamen before the army did so. SpeciWcally, the Wrst navy
retirement plan for ofWcers antedated the Civil War, though the war inter-
rupted the implementation of that plan, and in 1867 Congress established
a retirement plan for seamen. The army and the navy had fundamentally
different pension plans dating from the onset of the Revolution. From the
Civil War, however, there was a general movement toward making the army
and navy pension plans more uniform even though differences remained
well into the twentieth century. For example, the act of 1885, which covered
enlisted army personnel, was extended to enlisted navy personnel in 1899.
The main difference in treatment of the members of the two services
was that a seaman must have obtained the age of 50 to receive the retire-
ment pension. This and other minor differences between the army and navy
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pension plans for noncommissioned ofWcers and other enlisted personnel
was changed in 1907. From that year on, all enlisted personnel in both ser-
vices were entitled to retire voluntarily at 75 percent of their pay and other
allowances after 30 years of service.
With respect to the convergence of pension plans covering ofWcers, recall
that naval ofWcers were initially covered by the 1855 plan, the Wrst formal
retirement plan for U.S. military personnel. The 1861 pension act super-
seded that earlier legislation, and both the army and the navy were covered
by acts passed during the war. However, from the time of the navy’s 1867
plan, the key details of the two systems diverged, and the process of making
the regular army and navy pensions more alike was interrupted somewhat
by the Spanish American War. In 1899, under pressure from then Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Congress altered the navy retire-
ment system without changing the army’s system. Although not the kind
of man to labor over the details of an annuity contract, Roosevelt actually
had an excellent general understanding of both the economics and the poli-
tics of public-sector pensions, having begun his career in Washington as a
member of President Cleveland’s Civil Service Commission. Furthermore,
Roosevelt’s perpetual quest for reform, the urge to do something, led him to
examine all aspects of naval operations, including the retirement of naval
personnel. To Roosevelt, this was a good method to rid himself of ofWcers
who did not share his reformist leanings.
Roosevelt proposed that all mid-level ofWcers (i.e., those in the grade of
lieutenant, lieutenant commander, commander, and captain) become eligi-
ble to apply for retirement regardless of their age or time in uniform.5
Applicants for retirement were to be listed according to seniority. The act
then speciWed a minimum number of vacancies in a Wscal year. These vacan-
cies were essentially opportunities for promotion to a higher rank. Pro-
motional prospects were based on a speciWc number of vacancies above
each rank; speciWcally these were: 13 vacancies above commander, 20 above
lieutenant commander, 29 above lieutenant, and 40 above lieutenant junior
grade. If the actual number of vacancies was less than the minimum
speciWed in the act, then the President was authorized to retire enough
ofWcers from the voluntary list to achieve the minimum number of vacan-
cies. Should this process still not yield enough vacancies, then the Secretary
of the Navy was authorized to convene a retirement board of Wve rear admi-
rals. This board was charged with reviewing all active-duty line ofWcers and
retiring enough of them to obtain the minimum number of vacancies.
However, the maximum number of ofWcers so retired each year was not to
exceed Wve captains, four commanders, four lieutenant commanders, or
two lieutenants.
These so-called “plucking boards,” which were responsible for identify-
ing those unWt to continue on active duty, were by all accounts quite unpop-
ular among the ofWcer corps. Still, despite subjecting ofWcers to the vagaries
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of an early retirement, there were two features that ameliorated the impact
of the act. OfWcers could avoid the ignominy of forced retirement by vol-
unteering to retire, and there was a ceiling on the number who could be so
retired. In addition, all ofWcers retired under this plan were to receive 75
percent of the sea pay of the next rank above that which they held at the
time of retirement. This last feature was amended in 1912 and ofWcers sim-
ply received three-fourths of the pay of the rank in which they retired.
During expansion of the navy leading up to America’s participation in the
World War I, the plan was further amended in 1915 so that the President
was authorized, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to reinstate any
ofWcer involuntarily retired under the 1899 act.
As the byzantine act of 1899 suggests, the navy continued to struggle with
its superannuated ofWcers. In 1908, Congress Wnally granted naval ofWcers
the right to retire voluntarily at 75 percent of active-duty pay upon the com-
pletion of 30 years of service. In 1916, navy pension rules were again
altered, and this time a basic principle—up or out (with a pension)—was
established, a principle that continues to this day. The pension legislation
of 1916 was part of the appropriations bill for the 1917 Wscal year. As such
it could not be opposed without placing the expeditious Wnancial prepara-
tions for war in jeopardy. There were four basic components that differen-
tiated the new navy pension plan from earlier ones. First, promotion to the
ranks of rear admiral, captain, and commander were based on the recom-
mendations of a promotion board. Prior to that time, promotions were
based solely on seniority.6
Second, the ofWcers on the active list were to be distributed among the
ranks according to percentages that were not to exceed certain limits; thus,
there was a limit placed on the number of ofWcers who could be promoted
to a certain rank. Third, age limits were placed on ofWcers in each grade.
OfWcers who obtained a certain age in a certain rank were retired with their
pay equal to 2.5 percent multiplied by the number of year in service, with
the maximum not to exceed 75 percent of their Wnal active-duty pay. For
example, a commander who reached age 50 and who had not been selected
for promotion to captain, would be placed on the retired list. If he had
served 25 years, then he would receive 62.5 percent of his base pay upon
retirement. Finally, the act also imposed the same mandatory retirement
provision on naval personnel as the 1882 act (amended in 1890) imposed
on army personnel, with age 64 being established as the universal age of
retirement in the armed forces of the United States. The number of veter-
ans covered by these “regular” pensions is shown in Table 8.6.
As for the army by the time war broke out between the United States and
Spain, the army disability pensions discussed above were so well adminis-
tered and considered to be so generous that Congress did not create a spe-
cial pension plan for the veterans of the Spanish American War. Table 8.5
contains the information covering the eventual pensioners from that conXict.
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With respect to retirement plans, the pension act of 1882, with its sub-
sequent revisions, remained the basic army plan until after World War I.
After the war, the army followed the navy in moving to a system whereby
ofWcers who were no longer in line for future promotions were automati-
cally retired with no regard to extenuating circumstances. The Wrst step in
this direction came in 1919, when Congress allowed the War Department to
place ofWcers retired early due to the inability to perform their duties on
the “unlimited” list as opposed to the 350-man “limited” list. This Wnally
broke the bottleneck in army promotions that had plagued army adminis-
trators since the Civil War. 
In the following year, Congress created an army retirement plan not
unlike that adopted in 1916 by the navy. As part of their evaluations by
their superiors, all ofWcers were placed in either Class A or Class B. Those
categorized as Class B were evaluated by a board of ofWcers, and if the
board determined that a Class B ofWcer had been so designated because of
neglect of duty or misconduct, then the ofWcer was discharged without com-
pensation. If, however, the ofWcer had served 10 or more years and was not
deemed negligent, then he was placed upon the unlimited retired list. As
such, he was to receive a retirement beneWt equal to 2.5 percent multiplied
by years of service not to exceed 75 percent of his base pay at the time of
retirement. This maximum was subsequently reduced to 60 percent in 1924.
Although there were subsequent revisions to the army and navy pension
plans, the acts of 1916 for navy personnel and 1920 for the army established
the foundations of the modern U.S. military pension plan. The key ele-
ments of the uniWed military pension were mandatory retirement, a limited
time to demonstrate superior potential for promotion to the next grade,
and a deWned beneWt retirement plan for those who failed to demonstrate
that potential or who reached the mandatory retirement age. Interestingly,
it was at almost the same time that Congress established a retirement plan
for federal (that is, nonmilitary) civil servants (Chapter 9). 
Overall then, Table 8.7 contains a summary of most important legislation
pertaining to military pensions in the United States from colonial times
through the Great War. Table 8.8 contains a summary of pension outlays
after 1866, while Table 8.9 presents the inXation-adjusted expenditures in
2000 dollars.
Modern Military Pensions and the
Principles of Economics
Although for many readers this history of post-Civil War military pensions
will be interesting in its own right, others will be ediWed to learn that it
provides additional evidence illustrating how military administrators, ser-
vice men, and policymakers in the late nineteenth century responded to the
economic environment they faced. There are several characteristics of this
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Table 8.7. Important Military Pension Acts of the United States, by Date, Act,
Service, and Key Provisions
1775 Continental Congress Revolutionary navy
A portion of the proceeds of prizes taken by the navy would be used to pay
disability beneWts to ofWcers and seamen, and death beneWts to widows and chil-
dren of those who died in service.
August 26, 1776 Continental Congress Revolutionary army
Half-pay for life or the term of disability, with proportionate amounts for minor
disabilities that interfered with earning a livelihood.
May 15, 1778 Continental Congress Revolutionary army
Half-pay for 7 years for ofWcers serving for the duration (not to exceed half-pay of
a colonel) and $80 per year for enlisted personnel.
August 24, 1780 Continental Congress Revolutionary army
The Act of 1778 was extended to widows and orphans.
October 21, 1780 Continental Congress Revolutionary army
OfWcers serving for the duration half-pay for life.
March 22, 1783 Commutation Act Revolutionary army
Veterans were granted Wve years’ full pay in money or 6 percent securities in lieu
of half-pay for life.
April 30, 1790 1 Stat. 119, Ch. 10 Regular army
Compensation for total disability was not to exceed half-pay for ofWcers or $5 a
month for enlisted personnel, with proportionate amounts for lesser
disabilities.
August 4, 1790 1 Stat. 138, Ch. 34 Revolutionary army
The Act of 1783 was honored with interest-bearing securities of  the new
government.  
(Payments to disabled veterans and survivors were authorized on an annual basis
until they were Wnally continued for life in 1828.)
February 28, 1793 1 Stat. 324, Ch. 17 Revolutionary army
Claims for Revolutionary War Pensions had to be submitted within two years of
the date of the Act. (Later acts permitted veterans to Wle for subsequent
disabilities that were associated with war injuries.)
1798, 1 Stat. 799, Ch. 24, Regular navy
Legislation enacted for the government of the navy formally established the pension
fund as a depository for the government’s share of the proceeds from the sale of
prizes.
March 2, 1799 1 Stat. 709, Ch. 24 Regular navy
OfWcers/seamen disabled in the line of duty were to receive half-pay for life, with
provision for payment for life to their widows if they were married at the time they
received the injury that resulted in death.
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June 26, 1812 2 Stat. 759, Ch. 107 Regular navy
A pension fund supervised by the Secretary of the Navy was established for
privateers in which was deposited 2 percent of the prize money earned by U.S.
privateers.
April 16, 1816 3 Stat. 285, Ch. 55 War of 1812 army
Half-pay was granted for Wve years to widows and orphans.
April 24, 1816 2 Stat. 296, Ch. 68 Regular army
Maximum pay for disabled enlisted personnel was raised to $8.00 and junior
ofWcers by $2.00–$3.00. (Throughout this era ofWcers and enlisted personnel
received severance pay, and this payment aften included land warrants in the so-
called military reserves. These beneWts were extended to widows and orphans.
See in particular the Act of Dec. 24, 1811 [2 Stat. 669, Ch. 10].)
1824 4 Stat. 4, Ch. 15 Regular navy
This legislation repealed the Act of March 3, 1817 which had (after the War of
1812) broadened the Wve-year half-pay pension entitlements to include widows
and orphans of naval ofWcers and seamen who died as a result of disease
contracted in the naval service, as well as from wounds received in battle.
May 15, 1828 4 Stat. 269, Ch. 53 Revolutionary army
All surviving veterans covered by the October 1780 legislation were granted full
pay for life retroactive to March 3, 1826.
June 7, 1832 4 Stat. 529, Ch. 126 Revolutionary army
BeneWts of the May 15, 1828 Act were extended to all veterans, with the
maximum equal to a captain’s pay and proportional payments for time served.
1842 12 Stat. 600, Ch. 204 Regular navy
fund was completely exhausted Navy pensions were paid from annual
appropriations until reestablishment of the fund under the Act of July 17, 1862.
June 15, 1844 5 Stat. 667, Ch. 58 Regular navy/marines
Responsibility for the payment of pensions to seamen (or their wives or
orphans) by virtue of wounds incurred in combat with the enemy while on board
armed privated ships of the United States was assumed by the government
(retroactive to July 1, 1837, when the privateer pension fund had been depleted).
May 13, 1846 9 Stat. 9, Ch. 16 Mexican War army
Half-pay was not to exceed half-pay of a lieutenant colonel.
July 21, 1848 9 Stat. 249, Ch. 108 Mexican War army
Half-pay for Wve years was granted to widows and orphans.
February 28, 1855 10 Stat. 616, Ch. 127 Regular navy
“An Act to Promote the EfWciency of the Navy” provided a board to examine and
report to the Secretary of the Navy the efWciency of ofWcers in the navy, ashore
and aXoat.  Those ofWcers found incapable of performing their duties would be
dropped from the rolls or placed on the reserved list under which they would
receive leave of absence or furlough pay.
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January 16, 1857 11 Stat. 153, Ch. 12 Regular navy
Amendments to the 1855 statute were enacted to permit ofWcers to be restored to
the active list after application and appropriate examination by a board of
inquiry.  If the board recommended restoration, the President might nominate
the retired ofWcer to the Senate.  If not, the ofWcer remained on the retired list,
receiving leave of absence or furlough pay.
June 3, 1858 11 Stat. 309, Ch. 85 Mexican War army
The provisions of the 1848 Act were extended to life.
July 22, 1861 12 Stat. 268, Ch. 9 Civil War army
Civil War volunteers received the same disability pension as those disabled in the
regular army.  The widows/legal heirs of those killed in service received $100 plus
any arrears of pay due the deceased member.
August 3, 1861 12 Stat. 287, Ch. 42 Civil War army
Provided for the transfer of career ofWcers to the retired list as a result of
incapacity for active service, on approved Wndings of a retirement board, or for
retirement after 40 years of service, on application of the ofWcer.  Retirement pay
was equal to pay proper of their grade plus 4 rations a day, commuted to 30 cents
each ration. A fundamental weakness of the act was that it limited the total num-
ber of ofWcers on the retired list to a maximum of 7 percent of the authorized
strength of the active list.
July 14, 1862 12 Stat. 566, Ch. 166 Civil War army
established the general law pension system, subsequently amended by the Act of
July 17, 1862.
July 17, 1862 12 Stat. 596 Civil War army
OfWcers of the army or marine corps over age 62 or with more than 45 years’
service might be retired at the discretion of the President.  The 7 percent limit on
the size of the retirement list was retained.
March 2, 1867 14 Stat. 515, Ch. 14 Regular navy
Enlisted men who had served honorably in the navy for 20 years or more and were
disabled for sea service because of age or inWrmity received 50 percent active-duty
pay.  Any disabled person serving honorably for 10 or more years could apply for
aid from the pension fund, receiving no more than half of active-duty pay.
1870, 16 Stat. 315, Ch. 294 Regular army
authorized retirement based on 30 or more years of service (at the discretion of
the President) and Wxed the pay of retired ofWcers at 75 percent of the pay of the
grade at which retired.
July 15, 1870 16 Stat. 315, Ch. 294 Regular army
Further reduction in active-strength ceilings along with some relief from the 7 per-
cent limit previously placed on the retirement list.
February 14, 1871 16 Stat. 411, Ch. 50 War of 1812 army
general service-pension like that of May 15, 1828 for Revolutionary War
veterans was extended to War of 1812 veterans.
June 30, 1882 22 Stat. 117, 118, Ch. 254 Regular army
introduced the compulsory retirement principle based on age 64.
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February 14, 1885 23 Stat. 305, Ch. 67 Regular army
Provided for retirement upon completion of 30 years’ service with retirement
equal to 75 percent of the pay of the rank in which retired.
January 29, 1887 24 Stat. 371, Ch. 70 Mexican War army
Disability, indigence, or age 62 entitled veterans or their widows to $8 a month for
life or the length of disability or indigence. (All widows’ payments required that
the widow remain unmarried.)
September 30, 1890 26 Stat. 504, Ch. 11252 Regular army
Enlisted men were allowed to compute certain active wartime service as
double time when computing the 30 years necessary for retirement.
October 1, 1890 26 Stat. 562, Ch. 1241 Regular army
provided for the compulsory retirement of ofWcers failing physically upon exami-
nation for promotion.
1899 30 Stat. 1004, Ch. 413 Regular navy
The 30-year retirement privilege was extended to enlisted members of the navy
with the added proviso that applicants must concurrently be at least 50 years
of age.
March 3, 1899 30 Stat. 1004, Ch. 413 Regular navy
Captains, commanders, and lieutenant commanders might apply for voluntary
retirement without limit to age or service.
March 2, 1907 34 Stat. 1216, Ch. 2515 Regular army
added an allowance in lieu of quarters, fuel, and light.
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Table 8.8. Pension Outlays for the Army, Navy, and Total, 1865–1917, Number of
Pensioners, and Average Outlay per Pensioner
Fiscal year outlays Total Annual
Year Army Navy Total pensioners average
1866 $15,158,598.64 $291,951.24 $15,450,549.88 126,722 $121.92
1867 20,552,948.47 231,841.22 20,784,789.69 155,474 133.69
1868 22,811,183.75 290,325.61 23,101,509.36 169,643 136.18
1869 28,168,323.34 344,923.93 28,513,247.27 187,963 151.70
1870 29,043,237.00 308,251.78 29,351,488.78 198,686 147.73
1871 28,081,542.41 437,250.21 28,518,792.62 207,495 137.44
1872 29,276,921.02 475,825.79 29,752,746.81 232,189 128.14
1873 26,502,528.96 479,534.93 26,982,063.89 238,411 113.17
1874 29,603,159.24 603,619.75 30,206,778.99 236,241 127.86
1875 28,727,104.76 543,300.00 29,270,404.76 234,821 124.65
1876 27,411,309.53 524,900.00 27,936,209.53 232,137 120.34
1877 27,659,461.72 523,360.00 28,182,821.72 232,104 121.42
1878 26,251,725.91 534,283.53 26,786,009.44 223,998 119.58
1879 33,109,339.92 555,089.00 33,664,428.92 242,755 138.68
1880 55,901,670.42 787,558.66 56,689,229.08 250,802 226.03
1881 49,419,905.35 1,163,500.00 50,583,405.35 268,830 188.16
1882 53,328,192.05 984,980.00 54,313,172.05 285,697 190.11
1883 59,468,610.70 958,963.11 60,427,573.81 303,658 199.00
1884 56,945,115.25 967,272.22 57,912,387.47 322,756 179.43
1885 64,222,275.34 949,661.78 65,171,937.12 345,125 188.84
1886 63,034,642.90 1,056,500.00 64,091,142.90 365,783 175.22
1887 72,464,236.69 1,288,760.39 73,752,997.08 406,007 181.65
1888 77,712,789.27 1,237,712.40 78,950,501.67 452,557 174.45
1889 86,996,502.15 1,846,218.43 88,842,720.58 489,725 181.41
1890 103,809,250.39 2,285,000.00 106,094,250.39 537,944 197.22
1891 114,744,750.83 2,567,939.67 117,312,690.50 676,160 173.50
1892 135,914,611.76 3,479,535.35 139,394,147.11 876,068 159.11
1893 153,045,460.94 3,861,177.00 156,906,637.94 966,012 162.43
1894 136,495,965.61 3,490,760.56 139,986,726.17 969,544 144.38
1895 136,156,808.35 3,650,980.43 139,807,788.78 970,524 144.05
1896 134,632,175.88 3,582,999.10 138,215,174.98 970,678 142.39
1897 136,313,914.64 3,635,802.71 139,949,717.35 976,014 143.39
1898 140,924,348.71 3,727,531.09 144,651,879.80 993,714 145.57
1899 134,671,258.68 3,683,794.27 138,355,052.95 991,519 139.54
1900 — — 138,462,130.65 993,529 139.36
1901 — — 138,531,483.84 997,735 138.85
1902 — — 137,504,267.99 999,446 137.58
1903 — — 137,759,653.71 996,545 138.24
1904 — — 141,093,571.49 994,762 141.84
1905 — — 141,142,861.33 998,441 141.36
1906 — — 139,000,288.25 985,971 140.97
1907 — — 138,155,412.46 967,371 142.82
1908 — — 153,093,086.27 951,687 160.86
1909 — — 161,973,703.77 946,194 171.18
1910 — — 159,974,056.08 921,083 173.68
1911 — — 157,325,160.35 892,098 176.35
1912 — — 152,986,433.72 860,294 177.83
1913 — — 174,171,660.80 820,200 212.36
1914 — — 172,417,546.26 785,239 219.57
1915 — — 165,518,266.14 748,147 221.24
1916 — — 159,155,089.92 709,572 224.30
1917 — — 160,895,053.94 673,111 239.03
Source: Data until 1899 from Glasson (1900); data from 1900 from Glasson (1918) based
on Reports of the Commissioner of Pensions, especially the 1917 report, pp. 29–30. Per
capita outlays calculated by the authors.
Years are Wscal years.
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Table 8.9. InXation-Adjusted Total Pension Outlays and Real Outlays per Pensioner,
1866–1917 (in dollars of 2000 purchasing power)
Total pension outlays Per pensioner
Year ($M 2000) ($ 2000)
1866 143.690 1,133.86
1867 209.926 1,350.27
1868 242.566 1,429.89
1869 310.794 1,653.53
1870 337.542 1,689.89
1871 342.226 1,649.28
1872 351.082 1,512.05
1873 337.276 1,414.63
1874 392.688 1,662.18
1875 392.223 1,670.31
1876 377.139 1,624.59
1877 403.014 1,736.31
1878 401.790 1,793.70
1879 471.302 1,941.52
1880 827.663 3,300.04
1881 708.168 2,634.24
1882 765.816 2,680.55
1883 888.285 2,925.30
1884 874.477 2,709.39
1885 997.131 2,889.25
1886 987.004 2,698.39
1887 1,128.421 2,779.25
1888 1,223.733 2,703.97
1889 1,430.368 2,920.70
1890 1,665.680 3,096.35
1891 1,923.928 2,845.40
1892 2,188.488 2,498.03
1893 2,677.413 2,761.31
1894 2,421.770 2,497.77
1895 2,404.694 2,477.66
1896 2,432.587 3,627.01
1897 2,421.130 2,480.65
1898 2,603.734 2,620.26
1899 2,352.036 2,372.18
1900 2,423.087 2,438.80
1901 2,382.742 2,388.22
1902 2,255.070 2,256.31
1903 2,286.810 2,294.78
1904 2,313.935 2,326.18
1905 2,328.857 2,332.44
1906 2,224.005 2,255.52
1907 2,182.856 2,256.56
1908 2,449.489 2,573.76
1909 2,478.198 2,619.05
1910 2,495.595 2,709.41
1911 2,391.342 2,680.52
1912 2,264.199 2,631.88
1913 2,525.489 3,079.22
1914 2,482.813 3,161.81
1915 2,333.808 3,119.48
1916 2,005.354 2,826.18
1917 1,705.488 2,533.72
Source: Nominal total outlays and per pensioner averages from the previous tables.
Conversion to inXation-adjusted (real 2000 dollar purchasing power) done using multi-
plicative factors for December of each Wscal year. The average factor over the period
shown as measured by the arithmetic mean was 17.74 and the median was 15.25. The
range of the factors was from 9.3 in 1866 to a high of 18.0 in 1898.
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history that closely follow our discussion of the economics of pensions in
general and military pensions in particular. The Wrst is the initial diver-
gence, and subsequent long-run convergence, of the basic features of the army
and navy pensions plans. The economic reasons for the early divergence of
the basic features of the two plans was discussed at length in earlier chap-
ters. Basically, the argument was that, in the age of sail, monitoring ships
at sea was prohibitively costly and many forms of naval compensation, in-
cluding the funding of the navy pension plan, were based on an incentive
scheme tied to the capture of prizes. As a component of overall compensa-
tion, navy pensions were also covered by the prize system. Army activities
could be monitored more directly, and, as a result, army compensation was
not tied to any formal incentive scheme nor were army pensions; rather
army wages and pensions were paid on a pay-as-you-go system.
Eventually, however, the two systems converged. There are several rea-
sons for that convergence. The Wrst is based on the evolution of the tech-
nology and organization of modern warfare. One of the striking features of
the evolution of naval warfare from the age of sail to the that of the dread-
nought was the demise of the prize system. As naval vessels grew in size and
speed, developments that themselves were the result of improvements in
metallurgy and power transmission, it became increasingly difWcult for one
ship to render another immobile for boarding and seizure. In the age of
sail, a man-of-war could attempt to disable an opponent by shooting away
spars, masts, sails, and rigging. Before the prey could repair the damage, it
was boarded and seized. Such was not the case with a more modern man-of-
war, nor was it the case for a modern merchantman. 
Another technological change that fundamentally altered the economics
of naval warfare was the advance in the size, velocity, and accuracy of naval
gunnery. Killing with a Wrearm is essentially an exercise in physics; that is
mass and velocity, coupled with accuracy, determine the effectiveness of the
shot. An accurate, large-caliber weapon Wred at a high velocity offers the
most deadly combination. This characteristic of modern naval warfare was
all too obvious to observers of the American success in the war with Spain
in which two American Xeets on opposite ends of the world devastated their
Spanish counterparts with their effective Wre power. As Admiral A. S. Barker
said of the U.S. engagements with the Spanish Xeets in 1898: “An hour or
two at Manila, an hour or two at Santiago, and the maps of the world were
changed” (Miller 1997) and so too was naval warfare. In the age of Nelson,
ships of a few hundred tons lobbed shell after shell at one another from a
few hundred yards, often with little effect; 140 years later the Bismarck sank
the Hood, all 41,000 tons of her, with one shot Wred from Wve miles away.
The escalation of the killing power of naval vessels rendered obsolete any
notion of a commerce raider capturing and hauling a fellow man-of-war
into a prize court.
But what about strictly commerce raiding? If a commerce-raiding capital
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ship caught a lone merchantman, the raider could often persuade the cap-
tain of the merchantman to surrender the ship, but then the question arose
as to what to do with the potential prize. Because of the advances in the
speed of the capital ships and wireless telegraphy, after the capture, the
raider simply assumed the merchantman’s problem. How to get the cap-
tured ship into a safe port? Compounding the difWculty of the prize game for
both parties were two other developments, one old and the other new. The
former was organizational, the latter technological. In order to solve the lone
merchantman’s problem, combatants adopted the convoy system, which had
been common in the age of sail—a large number of merchant vessels guarded
by a smaller number of naval vessels. The accompanying vessels were fast
destroyers that could launch torpedoes at the larger capital ships engaged
in commerce raiding. No lone raider could successfully attack a convoy. 
The technological innovation that solved this problem and led to a new
type of raiding was of course the submarine. The submarine solved several
problems for the raider. In terms of being able to sink a ship, it had all the
Wrepower it needed, since the killing power of a torpedo was vastly multi-
plied by the energy unleashed by striking at or below the waterline. Until
well into the Second World War, Wnding and catching a submarine was
quite difWcult. However, the same technology that made the submarine so
deadly made its capture of a prize impractical. The submarine was a small
highly specialized instrument, and it was provisioned for and maintained by
a small crew with nothing to spare. Surface raiders could carry the extra
men to seize and guide a prize into court; a submarine could not spare the
men. Furthermore, even if a submarine could capture rather than sink a
merchantman, the submarine would have not been able to defend the prize
against the subsequent attack of an enemy raider or, later, aircraft. Taken
together these developments killed the prize system. During the War of
1812, the U.S. frigate Constitution and H.M.S. Shannon represented the apex
of vessels designed to wage a war in which capture not destruction was the
ultimate end. The dreadnought, however, was designed to send an oppo-
nent to the bottom, not to a prize court.
The U.S. Congress formally dismantled the prize system after the anni-
hilation of the Spanish Xeets during the war with Spain. A sunken warship
still yielded “gun” and “head” money (see Chapter 3), but the cost of set-
tling disputes concerning ships sent to the bottom of the sea proved pro-
hibitive and the practice was outlawed. During World War I, some private
merchants offered to pay U.S. seamen “gun” and “head” money for sinking
German ships. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels respectfully declined
to accept their offer (Perry 1919). The British continued the practice
through World War II, but compared to the past it yielded little income to
British seamen (Oliver 1946).
Another reason for the convergence of the army and navy pension plans
is related to the technological innovations described above. With advances
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in the speed of sea transportation and in wireless communication, moni-
toring naval activity became a much less costly affair. In the age of sail, a
ship of the line might have gone for long periods with little or no contact
with the admiralty or fellow combatants. In the age of the dreadnought, a
captain’s actions or inaction could be monitored much more closely, thus
ameliorating the need for an incentive scheme based on prizes.
The Wnal explanation of the convergence of army and navy plans was the
quest for a reduction in the cost of managing two entirely separate pension
plans. After the Civil War, the navy pension plan received a great deal of
criticism because it had the potential to be much more lucrative than that
offered to army veterans. From a managerial standpoint, Congress viewed
the two services as roughly equal contributors to the welfare of the repub-
lic. Therefore, large differences in compensation between the two services
were bad for the morale of at least one of them. From a managerial point
of view, this would have led to an overallocation of certain resources, such
as skilled workers, to the higher-paying service. There were also basic issues
of equity. Risking one’s life for one’s country was perceived as equally valu-
able whether one did so on a blockading vessels, or in the trenches, or in a
cavalry regiment facing a native insurrection. As a result, there was a long-
run movement in Congress to equate the compensation of the two services.
These phenomena explain the convergence of the two plans. Let us now
turn to the other important characteristics of military pensions in the
United States. Among these is the emergence of a retirement pension plan—
that is a deferred compensation plan regardless of disability. As discussed in
Chapter 2, the deferred nature of the compensation was designed to bond
the soldier or seaman to the service. However, one of the problems faced by
nineteenth-century civilian leaders was that the bonding of military per-
sonnel, particularly ofWcers, to their services was all too strong. Once in the
military, they chose to simply retire on the job, continuing to receive full
pay rather than the reduced pay offered by off-job retirement. So it became
necessary to induce soldiers to retire through various schemes, including
presidential prerogative, plucking boards, and mandatory retirement. The
basic problem with the early attempts at mandatory retirement was that pro-
motion occurred almost entirely based on seniority. Therefore, there was
no effective way of weeding out unWt ofWcers. It was only at the end of the
nineteenth century that the navy Wnally solved this problem by promoting
on merit while simultaneously limiting the time a less-then-meritorious ofW-
cer could spend in a particular rank. 
Finally, it is worth noting that in addition to emerging before those for
other workers, U.S. military pensions were quite lucrative relative to other
early plans. Few public sector workers could equal the 75 percent replace-
ment rates on the typical U.S. military pension in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Although U.S. retirement pensions generally
came later than those for European soldiers, excluding the exceptional
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military pension that accompanied a peerage in Europe, U.S. military pen-
sions typically exceeded those offered in Europe. The same cannot be said
of U.S. civil service pensions, for the simple reason that there was no U.S.
civil service pension plan until 1920.
Notes
1. See Chapter 4.
2. The Newburgh Conspiracy has received many different treatments in the liter-
ature of the American Revolution. This discussion owes much to Ferguson (1961).
For a more recent treatment, see Teipe (2002).
3. See Chapters 4 and 5.
4. Much of the material in this section is taken from Congressional Research
Service (undated); Congressional Research Service (1972); and U.S. House of
Representatives (1975).
5. Ranks in the U.S. services can be confusing to those unfamiliar with them. A
lieutenant in the navy holds essentially the same rank as a captain in the army;
whereas a captain in the navy is equivalent to a colonel in the army. The two junior
commissioned grades in the navy, ensign and lieutenant ( junior grade), correspond
with the army ranks of second lieutenant and Wrst lieutenant, respectively. To add to
the confusion the commanding ofWcer of a navy vessel carried the title of “captain”
even if his formal rank was lieutenant or commander.
6. The highest navy ranks of admiral and vice-admiral were made essentially by
political appointment.
The Development of the U.S. Army Pension Plan 153
08Chap8.qxd  2/27/03  9:32 AM  Page 153
